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The 1967 USS ''Forrestal'' fire was a devastating fire and series of chain-reaction explosions on 29 July 1967, that killed 134 sailors and injured 161 on the aircraft carrier USS ''Forrestal'' (CVA-59), after an electrical anomaly discharged a Zuni rocket on the flight deck. ''Forrestal'' was engaged in combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War at the time, and the damage exceeded US$72 million (equivalent to $ million today) not including the damage to aircraft.〔(【引用サイトリンク】url= http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/museum/FORRESTAL/Forrestal1.htm )〕 Future United States Senator John McCain, and future four star admiral and CINCPACFLT Ronald J. Zlatoper were among the survivors. ==Background== ''Forrestal'' had departed Norfolk, Virginia, in early June 1967. Upon completion of the required inspections for the upcoming West Pacific cruise, it then went on to Brazil for a show of force. It then set sail around the horn of Africa, and went on to dock for a short while at Leyte Pier at Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippine Islands before sailing to Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin on 25 July. For four days in the Gulf, aircraft of Attack Carrier Air Wing 17 flew approximately 150 missions against targets in North Vietnam. By 1967, the ongoing naval bombing campaign from Yankee Station represented by far the most intense and sustained air attack operation in the navy's history, with monthly demand for general purpose bombs ("iron bombs") greatly exceeding new production. The on-hand supply of bombs had dwindled throughout 1966, and become critically low by 1967, particularly the new 1000-lb Mark 83, which the navy greatly favored for its power-to-size ratio: a carrier-launched A4 Skyhawk, the navy's standard ground attack aircraft of the period, could carry either a single 2000-lb bomb, or two 1000-lb bombs, with the ability to strike two separate hardened targets in a single sortie being seen as more desirable in most circumstances. Until 1971, the US Air Force's primary ground attack aircraft in Vietnam was the much heavier, land-based, F-105 Thunderchief, which could carry two 2,000-lb M118 bombs and four 750-lb M117 bombs (both of which had large stockpiles available) simultaneously on a single sortie, and thus did not need to rely as heavily on the limited supply of 1000-lb bombs as the navy did. In training, the damage control team specializing in on-deck firefighting for ''Forrestal'' (Damage Control Team #8, led by Chief Petty Officer Gerald Farrier) had been shown films of navy ordnance tests demonstrating how a 1000-lb bomb could be directly exposed to a jet fuel fire for a full 10 minutes and still be extinguished and cooled without an explosive cook off.〔.〕 However, these tests were conducted using the new Mark 83 1000 lb bombs, which featured relatively stable Composition H6 explosive filler and thicker, heat-resistant cases, compared to their predecessors; H6, which is still used in many types of naval ordnance due to its relative insensitivity to heat, shock and electricity, is also designed to deflagrate instead of detonate when it reaches its ignition point in a fire, either melting the case and producing no explosion at all, or, at most, a subsonic low order detonation at a fraction of its normal power.〔.〕 The day before the accident (28 July), ''Forrestal'' was resupplied with ordnance from the ammunition ship USS ''Diamond Head''. The load included sixteen 1000-lb AN-M65A1 "fat boy" bombs (so nicknamed because of their short, rotund shape), which ''Diamond Head'' had picked up from the Subic Bay Naval Base and were intended for the next day's second bombing sortie. Some of the batch of AN-M65A1s ''Forrestal'' received were more than a decade old, having spent a portion of that exposed to the heat and humidity of Okinawa or Guam, eventually being improperly stored in open-air Quonset huts at a disused ammunition dump on the periphery of Subic Bay Naval Base. Unlike the thick-cased Mark 83 bombs filled with Composition H6, the AN-M65A1 bombs were thin-skinned and filled with Composition B, an older explosive with greater shock and heat sensitivity; Composition B also had the dangerous tendency to become more powerful (up to 50% by weight) and more sensitive if it was old or improperly stored. ''Forrestal's'' ordnance handlers had never even seen an AN-M65A1 before, and to their shock, the bombs delivered from ''Diamond Head'' were in terrible condition; coated with "decades of accumulated rust and grime" and still in their original packing crates (now moldy and rotten), some were stamped with production dates as early as 1953. Most dangerous of all, several bombs were seen to be leaking liquid paraffin phlegmatizing agent from their seams, an unmistakable sign that the bomb's explosive filler had degenerated with excessive age, and exposure to heat and moisture. According to Lieutenant R.R. "Rocky" Pratt, an aviator attached to VA-106, the concern and objection in ''Forrestal's'' ordnance handlers was striking, with many afraid to even handle the bombs; one officer wondered out loud if they would even survive the shock of a catapult assisted launch without spontaneously detonating, and others suggested they immediately jettison them. Since no one wanted to be responsible for scrubbing the next day's missions, the decision was made by ''Forrestal's'' ordnance officers to report the situation up the chain of command, to the ship's commanding officer, Captain John Beling, and inform him the bombs were, in their assessment, an imminent danger to the ship and should not be kept on board. Faced with this, but still needing 1000-lb bombs for the next day's missions, Beling demanded ''Diamond Head'' take the AN-M65A1s back in exchange for new Mark 83s, but was told by ''Diamond Head'' that they had none available to give him. The AN-M65A1 bombs had been returned to service specifically because there were not enough Mark 83s to go around. According to one crew-member on ''Diamond Head'', when they had arrived at Subic Bay to pick up their load of ordnance for the carriers, the base personnel who had prepared the AN-M65A1 bombs for transfer assumed ''Diamond Head'' had been ordered to dump them at sea on the way back to Yankee Station; when notified that the bombs were actually destined for active service in the carrier fleet, the commanding officer of the naval ordnance detachment at Subic Bay was so shocked that he initially refused the transfer, believing a paperwork mistake had been made. At the risk of delaying ''Diamond Head's'' departure, he refused to sign the transfer forms until receiving written orders from CINCPAC on the teletype, explicitly absolving his detachment of responsibility for the bombs' terrible condition. With orders to conduct strike missions over North Vietnam the next day, and with no replacement bombs available, Captain Beling reluctantly concluded that he had no choice but to accept the AN-M65A1 bombs in their current condition. In one concession to the demands of the ordnance handlers, Beling agreed to store all 16 bombs alone on deck in the "bomb farm" area between the starboard rail and the carrier's island until they were loaded for the next day's missions. Standard procedure was to store them in the ship's magazine with the rest of the air wing's ordnance; had they been stored as standard, an accidental detonation could easily have destroyed the entire ship. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「1967 USS Forrestal fire」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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